I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential increase in food safety incidents across the globe in the past decades have resulted in mushrooming regulatory initiatives, including new standards and requirements from national governments, international organizations, and private actors. Such regulatory initiatives, public as well as private, have emerged primarily to address the rapidly decaying public trust in modern global food chains, complicated by many factors including the globalization of economic activities, advancements in food science and transportation technology, the multinationalization of the food industry, and the advent of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Given the significantly transformed production, transportation, and consumption of food, 1 recent food safety incidents, with their intensified scope, severity, frequency, and impact, have become extremely challenging to cope with.
A World Health Organization (WHO) report indicates that food safety problems contribute to 1.5 billion cases of diarrhea in children and over three million premature deaths annually, both in developed and developing countries. 2 For example, approximately 1.8 million children die in developing countries yearly of foodborne diseases caused by contaminated food and water. 3 The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 48 million illnesses, 128,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 deaths result from foodborne diseases each year in the United States. 4 Despite the unprecedented numbers of food safety incidents, no multilateral treaty exists to monitor or regulate global food safety, other than the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), 5 which lightly touches upon the side issues of harmonization and scientification from an international-trade-law (facilitation of food trade) perspective.
In addition, as contaminated food outbreaks respect no national boundaries, unilateral measures adopted by national governments, even with a certain level of extraterritorial effects, fail to provide an effective or efficient approach to addressing the global food safety problem.
In light of the regulatory lacuna in public regulatory space, private actors, especially multinational food companies, supermarket chains and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are increasingly filling the gaps by employing private standards, certification protocols, third-party auditing, and transnational contracting practices. 6 The emergence of private governance in the food safety arena has been alongside the gradual decline of states' traditional command-and-control regulation, which is increasingly being replaced by more flexible, market-oriented mechanisms. 7 Examples include Global Good Agricultural Practices (GlobalGAP) and the British Retail Consortium (BRC) Global Standards, and Tesco's Nature's Choice. Although private standards are, in theory, not mandatory for suppliers, many have a de facto mandatory status, as a large part of buyers in global agri-food markets now require their suppliers to meet such private requirements, which are usually stricter than their public counterparts. enormous market power such as WalMart, Carrefour, and McDonald's, private ordering initiatives are able to "filter[] all the way back through processors, traders, and down to the level of agricultural production." 8 These initiatives are a testament to the increasing importance of private governance tools in the global regulatory space of food safety.
Nevertheless, the proliferating private ordering initiatives at different levels with different designs have given rise not only to concerns but also many interesting theoretical and practical questions, for their important public health, international trade, and development implications. As regulatory regimes in global administrative space do not operate in isolation, it is crucial to understand how global food safety governance is configured and reconfigured through complex regime interactions.
What strengths and weaknesses are associated with the private approach to food safety regulation? Are public and private forms of governance in competition or do they complement each other? What problems and opportunities are associated with public-private or other forms of regulatory collaboration? Whose values, interests or preferences tend to prevail when private-public institutions interact? What guiding principles, if any, should inform such public-private collaboration? This paper therefore endeavors to explore the structure and processes of private food safety governance and their interactions with the traditional public governance regimes so as to shed light on such inquiries. Part II offers a brief account of the public approach to food safety at the national and international level, pointing out its ineffectiveness and inefficiency in face with this global problem. Part III describes the emergence of private governance of food safety, its features and driving forces, as well as its merits and problems. This paper focuses on GlobalGAP as the primary example. In Part IV, I assess the regime interface between public and private governance sites. Part V concludes by emphasizing the importance of constructive regime interaction instead of institutional boundary building to global food safety governance. Private ordering should not be categorically seen as destructive market barriers or regulatory competition, but rather an integral part of a larger, dynamic and evolving governance complex, which facilitates active, mutually reinforcing spheres of orchestrated global food safety governance. 8 CLAPP & FUCHS, supra note 6, at 14.
II. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOVERNANCE OF FOOD SAFETY
With ever-increasing food safety crises and heightened public criticism of government failure, it is however remarkable that no multilateral legal instrument addresses these global food safety issues in a comprehensive manner. 9 Indeed, at the international level, relevant public institutions such as the WTO, WHO, and Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), face numerous difficulties and problems that undermine their effectiveness and efficiency in addressing global food safety crises.
First, the WTO multilateral trading system, which arguably wields the most significant influence on food safety issues, has never made food safety a core concern throughout its history. 10 The WTO has no provisions regarding the effective promotion of food safety beyond its set of trade agreements. 11 Its most relevant legal instrument, the SPS Agreement, does not require governments to take positive steps to ensure food safety, but stands as a means for WTO members to create exceptions to each another's food safety rules and standards, in effect, to facilitate food trade. 12 Some scholars argue that many SPS Agreement provisions are designed in an unbalanced manner at the expense of public health, and may further create unnecessary barriers to WTO members whose measures genuinely aim at food safety rather than protectionism. 13 Second, the Codex, established by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WHO in 1963, currently serves as the international body setting public food standards, but the scientific basis of its standards has faced serious challenges, as has the legitimacy of its substantive and procedural rules, the accountability of its 16 As demonstrated by the controversial disputes over beef growth hormones (BGH), genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and ractopamine meat leaner, the Codex has numerous problems such as its frequent use of majority vote rather than consensual decision, poor developing-country member participation, and potential conflicts of interest over scientific authority. 17 All of these problems have rendered Codex unbalanced between public health and fair food trade practices, and its current institutional design inadequate in producing good governance of global food safety.
Thirdly, the WHO, the United Nation's special agency mandated with global health issues, including that of food safety, has so far failed to play a leading role in creating or coordinating governance initiatives. 18 In addition, as argued by many international health law scholars, the WHO has failed to fully employ its normative authority delegated in WHO Constitution Articles 19, 21 and 23, 19 and in fact, it has refrained from adopting any binding legal instruments on food safety for over 65 years. 20 22 Lin, supra note 9, at 649-61. "In the United States, overlapping competencies among FDA, the USDA, and other federal agencies have undermined the efficiency of the government in handling routine food safety surveillance tasks and in responding to crises of foodborne hazards. Insufficient and ineffective border inspection of imported food remains a node of weakness for both the United States and the EU. In the EU, many inadequately outfitted new member states, although developing their scientific and regulatory capacities, undermine the effectiveness of the high-standard European General Food Law." Many factors have stimulated and facilitated the development and institutionalization of GlobalGAP and private food safety governance models as such. 25 First, the significantly industrialized and globalized patterns of food production and consumption have rendered food safety problems a regulatory issue beyond the scope of traditional state-centric mentality. The intense economic globalization of the past several decades has made national boundaries permeable to the flow of goods, services, humans, investment, and information. 26 The rapid advancement of food science and transportation technology, the advent of the WTO and its agreements aimed at trade liberalization, and the growth of transnational agri-food corporations have made global sourcing of food ingredients feasible and consequently have 23 Lin, supra note 9, at 661. 24 Id., at 650. 25 extended the global food supply chains. The rise of private food safety governance schemes (e.g., GlobalGAP) can be, to a degree, attributed to the globalization of food production and consumption. Global sourcing has also raised efficiency drivers (e.g., the reduction of transaction costs) of multinational food companies to effectively manage and control their upstream suppliers in different countries via standardization, certification, and third-party auditing methods. predecessor at the European level) to fill the regulatory gaps left by their public counterparts. 31 Apart from reputational costs concerns, private actors along food supply chains have increasingly engaged in games of product differentiation and marketing strategies. More specifically, driven by a variety of consumer expectations and preferences, private governance mechanisms now reach beyond safety and food quality, to environmental protection, fair trade, labor rights, or animal welfare, etc. 32 On the other hand, the BSE crisis has led to a public perception of the ineffectiveness of state-centric regulatory systems and has triggered various regulatory reforms, including the UK Food Safety Act 1990. 33 Recognizing the limits of the traditional command-and-control approach in global food supply chain era, a few reform projects adopted by governments (especially in Europe) have gradually shifted the responsibility for ensuring food safety from national governments to the food industry.
The UK Food Safety Act 1990 appears to be the benchmark legislation of "devolved responsibility." 34 Section 21 of the Act imposes "due diligence" requirements on the ultimate suppliers of branded food products, namely the retailers. Food suppliers bear full responsibility for food safety incidents unless they can prove that they have taken all reasonable precautions and have exercised all due diligence to prevent such incidents. 35 This shift of responsibility from the public to private domain has prompted in part the emergence and development of private governance vehicles aimed at managing legal risks via private standards, certification protocols, and transnational contracting practices. 94 (1990) . 34 See Casey, supra note 31, at 7-10. 35 Section 21, UK Food Safety Act 1990. 36 Lin, supra note 9, at 683 (2011). reforms characterized by responsibility shifts, has stimulated the development and institutionalization of private modes of food safety governance.
IV. INCREASED INTERACTIONS AT THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERFACES
The development and recent institutionalization of private regulatory mechanisms illustrate "governance beyond the state," 37 which describes new modes of governance designed and implemented by various non-state (private) actors. Food safety control measures traditionally have been regarded as a regulatory space exclusively filled by states, 38 with indirect participation by (the regulated) food companies. Now these companies are setting and implementing private rules and standards, and overseeing inspection and certification, which, individually and combined, may erode the centrality enjoyed by state authorities. Many observers argue that this rapid evolvement reflects a paradigm shift from state-centric approach to a broader focus of governance, 39 as private governance is increasingly gaining influence in the global market, and their authority and sanctions do not need to derive from national governments.
Given the enormous market and economic power (e.g., through procurement decisions) of multinational food companies involved in the private regulation, private rules and standards, although not required by national or international law, have arguably become de facto mandatory. 40 Theoretically, private rules and standards are not legally binding to suppliers-they are required to merely comply with the public laws and regulations of their respective jurisdictions or export destinations. However, as a practical matter, some private rules and standards have become the industry norm along global food supply chains, which in effect present as "binding requirements" when economic power asymmetry exists between the procurer and supplier. Because 37 retail markets in most industrialized countries are highly integrated, the economic power enjoyed by giant multinational corporations leaves little room for developing country suppliers: they usually must either comply with the industry standards or exit the market. 41 It is therefore understandable why many producers and exporters in developing countries fail to distinguish between private and governmental requirements, as they only know that to sell their product in a developed country market, they are required to comply with and inspected against certain rules and standards. 42 Public and private governance mechanisms, as a result, overlap as potentially competing regulatory spheres at the transnational level. Such potential regulatory competition is further amplified by the fact that the public-private interface is increasingly blurred especially in the cross-border context, as exporting-country suppliers are generally unaware of the nature, source or process of "law" in an importing country as well as the so-called public-private divide. Such overlap and blurred boundaries have raised concerns in interactions between public and private sites of governance in the global food regulatory space, which is of crucial importance but under-analyzed. 43 There are some studies on private food standards, such as those on GlobalGAP's impacts or the WTO SPS Agreement's provide possible responses to private standards. 44 However, such studies tend to observe private institutions (e.g., GlobalGAP) as well as public institutions (e.g., WTO) in isolation, and overlook the theoretical and practical implications of studying how interactions take place between the two. To fill this gap, this paper examines two important dimensions of interaction between public and private regulatory mechanisms in global food safety governance:
(1) interactions between private ordering and national authorities (see Figs. 1 and 2, the double arrows A); and (2) interactions between private ordering and relevant international organizations (see Figs. 1 and 2, the double arrows B) . 41 Difficulty especially for small suppliers in developing countries (cite) 42 (WTO, 10 December 2009) This is also why many developing WTO members are greatly concerned with the trade effect projected by private standards, especially when they are usually stricter than their public counterparts. Id. 43 The term "global food regulatory space" here falls in the concept of "global administrative space," as Figure 2) . Secondly, the "interaction" between public and private spheres has so far been mainly driven (initiated) by the concerns raised in the public spheres. In some circumstances, as a result, the patterns of such interaction are inherently "one-way" or "hierarchical."
46 It should be noted that there can be a vertical relationship between the private actor and the country of its legal residence. However, this relationship is rather traditional and relatively well-studied in a way that corporations are, as a matter of course, subject to national laws and regulations of a state that has jurisdiction over them. Therefore, this paper does not focus on such aspect at present. 47 
Interactions between Private Ordering and National Authorities
Given the ineffectiveness of public institutions in ensuring the safety of food products along global supply chains, the private mode of governance stands out for its adaptability, effectiveness, and transnational nature. This case illustrates this point.
In the absence of a multilateral or bilateral treaty on food safety regulation, country A, the importing country, generally cannot extend its law enforcement (e.g., factory inspections or microbiological tests) to producers located in country B, the exporting country. Country A thus bears the cost of ensuring the safety of food products from country B because the responsibility for spotting unsafe products normally rests on border inspections of importing countries. 49 global food supply chains as a market reality and have responded by cooperating with private regulatory schemes. For example, Kenya, Chile, India, Malaysia, and Mexico 68 have developed government-led Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and certification services at very low or no cost to assist small suppliers, and they have benchmarked such public certification services against private standards (e.g., so as to be recognized as equivalent to GlobalGAP-this is NOT hierarchical).
On the other hand, some developing countries have brought the issue of private standards up to the inter-governmental international level. Developing countries have used such international platforms to challenge private ordering and have requested that food regulation stay within public control or, at the very least, that private ordering be disciplined by principles set by public institutions (hierarchical). For example, in 2005, a delegate of St. Vincent and the Grenadines brought a complaint in the WTO SPS Committee about GlobalGAP requirements that restricted the country's ability to export bananas to the EU. 69 By raising its concern about GlobalGAP and other private entities in general at the WTO, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines triggered heated debate at the international level with countries divided on the issue. 70 Similar contested discussions also took place in other inter-governmental international organizations, including inter alia the Codex, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Interactions between Private Ordering and International Organizations
As noted, private standards were first brought to the WTO SPS Committee in 2005 by St Vincent and the Grenadines, which complained that the rules and standards of EurepGAP are more stringent than international standards and government 83 The 2010 Report nevertheless favored the stance that Codex standards, given they are scientifically backed and democratically adopted, should be the "benchmarks" for their private counterparts.
In the same year, the OIE organized a meeting with global private standard-setting bodies, including GlobalGAP and Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). OIE meeting attendees agreed that "the basis for private standards on sanitary safety are the existing international standards of OIE and Codex Alimentarius, as well as national and regional legislation," and that future collaboration between OIE, GlobalGAP, and GFSI should be encouraged. 84 compatibility of private standards with OIE standards." 85 Most importantly, toward this objective, in another meeting, the OIE followed up with selected private ordering bodies with a global reach and explored the possibility of signing official agreements with GlobalGAP and GFSI. The OIE concluded an official agreement with GFSI, as it is more of a benchmarking institution than a standard-setting institution. 86 However, because GlobalGAP is a standard-setting body and potentially competes with the OIE, the OIE decided not to enter into any official agreement with GlobalGAP at that time, but rather to merely continue to share information under an exchange-of-letters mechanism. 87 V. GLOBAL FOOD SAFETY GOVERNANCE THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE REGIME
INTERACTIONS
As a matter of fact, GlobalGAP and other private sector regulators, will continue to expand the range and variety of rules and standards to cover not only food safety standards, but also standards for sustainability, labor rights, and animal welfare. 88 However, the interactions between public and private institutions to date have been The perspective of the public institutions discussed here is rather one-way, hierarchical, and state-centric, as we can clearly see in the Codex 2010 Report, which underlines the "benchmark" superiority of Codex, as well as the OIE Resolutions, which treat GlobalGAP from the perspective of competition rather than of cooperation. As it seems unrealistic to try to contain and isolate private food safety governance sites or ignore their influence in the global market, a constructive framework for public-private regime interactions is desirable. Therefore, after showing the dynamic development and shifts of public-private institutional interplay over time, I conclude by presenting some preliminary ideas for further discourse toward a shared vision of the respective roles of private and public institutions in the broader architecture of global food safety governance.
First, given the interactive nature of global food safety governance, institutions have become less important as regulators executing their mandates and exercising their authority, but more important as platforms for inter-institutional interactions.
Although the legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of private ordering institutions remain issues of much debate, the current approaches adopted by relevant public institutions seem to ignore the interactive nature of global governance. Public institutions such as the WTO, Codex, and OIE, and many state governments aim to reinforce boundaries among individual institutions and protect the supremacy of public rules and standards despite the regulatory advantages of private ordering.
Second, the current discourse excessively centers upon the trade and development implications of private ordering, while overlooking its potential contribution to food safety regulation and public health in general. Observing the issue merely from a trade and development perspective may lead to an incomplete conclusion on the costs and benefits of the various models of governance. While high costs of compliance and barriers to export market have been cited as developing countries' main concerns, some research shows that meeting private standards does not necessarily harm developing countries but in some cases benefits them economically. 90 For example, private rules and standards may reduce transaction cost, enhance quality and price premiums, increase competitiveness and enhance market access. 91 While the empirical evidence on how private rules and standards affect developing countries is limited and the debates remain, 92 and although the public health benefits of private ordering has not been well considered, it is too early for relevant public institutions to "eliminate potential competitors" before seeking inter-institutional conversation and collaboration.
Third, public-private inter-institutional interactions are constructive to global food safety governance. As no meta-framework exists or appears to be emerging that dictates, coordinates, or pioneers the development of such diverse norms, the public as well as private institutions together constitute an evolving governance complex being formed and transformed, configured and reconfigured by different actors at different levels with different experimental approaches. 93 Public-private interinstitutional interactions in the process can serve as a vehicle for constructivist learning, mimesis, experimentation, and innovation, projecting normative effects on participating governance sites. The fact that GlobalGAP spurs regulatory reforms (or revisions of existing law) in many countries (both developing and developed), that the OIE takes a step toward legal innovation by signing an official cooperation agreement with a NGO, 94 and that the Codex reassess its decision-making process against the arguably more effective private standard-setters 95 all well demonstrate constructive regime interactions. Dynamic inter-institutional interactions in the food safety area can also help build scientific networks, activity coordination, information exchange, joint projects, and expert collaboration, which are mutually reinforcing in strengthening global food safety governance.
Finally, polycentric governance may call for a new understanding of legitimacy.
Some may argue that private governance models suffer from a legitimacy deficit, primarily due to private regulators' narrow pursuit of corporate profits rather than public goods, 96 and their lack of electoral mandate or democratic representativeness as enjoyed by public institutions. 97 Such a myriad of legitimacy deficit limits the roles of private governance and therefore, as noted by the World Bank, public standards and approaches would seem to remain indispensable. 98 Yet in many aspects such as supply chain expertise, participation, accountability, responsiveness, adaptability, and transparency, private institutions often perform better than the multilevel, bureaucratic public institutions-so whether Codex enjoys more legitimacy over GlobalGAP is a point of debate. 99 While the idea of global food safety governance confers no supremacy to either public or private institutions, their legitimacy derives from the extent to which their institutional design embeds social (economic, public health, and other) norms in the global marketplace, norms "that derive authority directly from interested audiences, including those they seek to
